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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and 
Appellant/Intervenor National Postal Mail Handler‟s Union 
(“NPMHU”) (collectively, the “Appellants”) appeal from the 
order of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, granting summary judgment to the Trenton 
Metropolitan Area Local of the American Postal Workers 
Union (“Trenton Metro”) on Trenton Metro‟s claim for 
enforcement of a settlement agreement between it and USPS.  
The Appellants argue that the present suit involves a tripartite 
dispute over work assignments and is, therefore, subject to the 
tripartite arbitration agreement entered into nationally 
between USPS, NPMHU, and the American Postal Workers 
Union (“APWU”), the last of which is Trenton Metro‟s parent 
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organization.  As a result, say the Appellants, the District 
Court erred both by looking to a separate agreement between 
USPS and Trenton Metro to resolve the dispute and by 
exercising jurisdiction in the first place.  Because we 
conclude that the present controversy is a dispute over which 
union‟s workers can staff a specific mail sorting machine, we 
agree that this is a tripartite dispute over work assignments 
and that, consequently, the binding tripartite arbitration 
procedures apply.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment and will order the 
dismissal of Trenton Metro‟s complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. The Contracts 
 
  1) RI-399’s Tripartite Dispute Resolution  
   Procedure 
 
 On April 16, 1992, USPS and the two unions 
representing its employees – APWU and NPMHU – entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding called Regional 
Instruction 399 (“RI-399”).  RI-399 is a national dispute 
resolution procedure, designed to resolve disputes over 
jurisdictional work assignments in any postal facility.
1
   
                                              
1
 A “jurisdictional work assignment” refers to the 
assignment of a particular job to a particular union.  Thus, a 
jurisdictional dispute is a dispute between the two unions over 
which union‟s workers should be assigned to a job. 
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Pursuant to RI-399, as of the date of its signing, all 
jurisdictional work assignments that were not then under 
dispute were “deemed as a proper assignment for that 
facility,” and both unions agreed not to “challenge[] 
jurisdictional work assignments in any operations as they” 
existed at the time.  (App. at 195.)  Those undisputed work 
assignments were then to be listed in “inventories” of work 
assignments maintained at the local level.  Going forward, 
any disputes over work assignments were to be resolved 
through the process outlined in RI-399, and those work 
assignments were then to be added to the inventories. 
 
 While RI-399 foreclosed the filing of new disputes 
over existing work assignments, it recognized three situations 
where new disputes could arise: (1) new or consolidated 
facilities; (2) new work in existing facilities; or (3) 
operational changes in existing facilities.  It is undisputed that 
only the last of those situations is relevant to this case.  RI-
399 prohibits USPS from “engag[ing] in operational changes 
for the purpose of affecting the jurisdictional assignments in a 
facility,” but recognizes that, nonetheless, operational 
changes “may result in the reassignment of functions from 
one craft to another.”2  (App. at 201-02.)  Where operational 
changes do result in reassignment, USPS is required to 
present those changes, thirty days before they go into effect, 
to a Local Dispute Resolution Council consisting of 
representatives from each party to RI-399.  The adversely 
affected party is then permitted to appeal the changes to 
binding tripartite arbitration, which must be held within sixty 
days after the changes go into effect.  If, at any point, the 
                                              
2
 A “craft” refers to a particular category of unionized 
worker, with the categorization based on job functions. 
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dispute is settled, the resulting settlement agreement must be 
tripartite.   
 
 Six months after the execution of RI-399, an 
explanatory document called a “Q & A” about the RI-399 
procedures (the “Q&A”) was issued and signed by each of the 
three national parties.  Item 3 in the Q&A clarifies that RI-
399 applies even to grievances alleging violations of contracts 
other than RI-399, so long as one of the parties believes that 
the grievance relates to a jurisdictional dispute.  In such 
situations, the question of whether the grievance relates to a 
jurisdictional dispute must itself be subjected to the RI-399 
procedures (culminating in tripartite arbitration) prior to any 
resolution of the merits of the grievance.  Item 4 states that 
any bilateral settlement agreement arising out of a 
jurisdictional dispute “is not a proper settlement and is 
considered null and void.”  (Supp. App. at 55.) 
 
  2) The USPS-APWU Bipartite Grievance  
   Resolution Procedure 
 
 Separate and distinct from RI-399‟s tripartite 
procedure for resolving jurisdictional disputes is a broad 
bipartite grievance resolution procedure contained in the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between USPS 
and APWU.  That procedure is contained in Article 15 of the 
CBA (“Article 15”) and is designed to resolve any grievance 
between USPS and APWU, with “grievance” defined as “a 
dispute, difference, disagreement or complaint between the 
parties related to wages, hours, and conditions of 
employment.”  (App. at 205.)  On its face, Article 15 applies 
only to disputes “between the parties” – i.e., between USPS 
and APWU – and, therefore, Article 15 is inapplicable to 
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jurisdictional disputes involving both APWU and NPMHU 
(which is not a party to the CBA or Article 15).  Instead, as 
noted above, all jurisdictional disputes must be resolved 
pursuant to RI-399. 
 
 For those grievances governed by Article 15, a four-
step resolution procedure is defined, commencing with a 
discussion of the grievance with a local supervisor and 
escalating as needed through more formal local, regional, and 
national procedures, culminating in binding bipartite 
arbitration.  Article 15, of course, allows for the grievance to 
be settled at any point prior to arbitration.   
 
B. Factual History 
 
 1) Trenton Metro’s Grievance Over   
   Operation of the AFSM-100 
 
The Trenton, New Jersey mail-processing facility (the 
“Trenton Post Office”) employs two groups of workers 
represented by the two union parties to RI-399: members of 
the mail processing clerk craft (“clerks” or “mail processors”) 
are represented by Trenton Metro, and members of the mail 
handlers craft (“mail handlers”) are represented by NPMHU.  
As mandated by RI-399, an inventory of undisputed work 
assignments is maintained at the Trenton Post Office (the 
“Trenton Inventory”), outlining which union has jurisdiction 
over various jobs at the facility.  Included in the Trenton 
Inventory are work assignments for the Automated Flat 
Sorting Machine 100 (“AFSM-100”), of which there are three 
in the Trenton Post Office.  The Trenton Inventory specifies 
that the AFSM-100 will normally be operated by five clerks.  
It allows, however, that heavy volume might periodically 
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require a sixth person to be added to the machine and that that 
person would normally be a mail handler.  If reduced volume 
then requires that a person be removed, the Trenton Inventory 
does not state whether the mail handler must first be removed 
or whether a clerk may be removed.  As a result, clerks were 
sometimes removed from the ASFM-100 prior to mail 
handlers being removed, and, on March 22, 2003, Trenton 
Metro filed a grievance under Article 15 protesting that 
practice.  Because the grievance was filed under Article 15, it 
invoked only a bipartite dispute resolution process involving 
USPS and APWU, but excluding NPMHU.   
 
When the grievance was not resolved at the first two 
steps of Article 15, it proceeded to regional arbitration at step 
three.  On September 26, 2005, the regional arbitrator sent a 
letter to the representatives for USPS and APWU stating that 
“his first impression of the case is that it is a R.I. 399 matter,” 
and, consequently, there was “a question as to whether or not 
the Mail Handlers should be invited to intervene.”  (App. at 
300.)  He asked the parties to clarify for him why the dispute 
was not “well beyond the scope of bilateral Regional 
arbitration.”  (Id.)  Ignoring the concerns expressed by the 
arbitrator, on October 28, 2005, USPS and APWU, without 
including NPMHU, entered into a “full and final settlement” 
of the grievance (the “AFSM-100 Settlement”).  That short 
agreement stated: 
 
The Trenton Inventory … designates work 
performed on the AFSM (see inventory) clerk 
work up to 5 Mail Processors per machine.  The 
inventory allows a MH to be a sixth person 
during heavy volume.  If reduction in work 
occurs, personnel will be moved in reverse 
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order.  The result is the Mail Processors will not 
fall below the 5 required positions prior to the 
extra Mail Handler being taken off the 
operation. 
 
(App. at 92.) 
 
Thus, under that agreement, and pursuant to the 
Trenton Inventory, any mail handler added to the AFSM-100 
during times of high volume would be removed first when 
there was a reduction in work.    
 
2) The Changes to the AFSM-100 
 
Between December 23, 2004 – ten months prior to the 
AFSM-100 Settlement – and February 8, 2006, USPS 
provided periodic updates to the national president of APWU 
regarding planned modifications to the AFSM-100, 
modifications that could result in “the elimination of one to 
two clerk positions” (App. at 319-323) at post offices around 
the country.  In a final letter on February 8, 2006, USPS 
disclosed specific details regarding the modifications to the 
AFSM-100, which would consist of two enhancements: an 
Automated Induction (“AI”) process and an Automated Tray 
Handling System (“ATHS”).  AFSM-100 machines receiving 
both enhancements
3
 (which the Trenton Post Office‟s 
machines did) would require one person to operate the AI‟s 
Load Station, one to four persons to operate the AI‟s Prep 
Station, one person to operate the AI‟s Feed Station, and one 
                                              
3
 USPS stated that some machines would receive only 
the ATHS enhancement, and some machines would receive 
no enhancements.   
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person to operate the ATHS.  The USPS letter stated that mail 
handlers would have primary jurisdiction over the Load 
Station, Prep Station, and ATHS, while clerks would have 
primary jurisdiction over the Feed Station.  Those 
jurisdictional assignments would result in just one clerk being 
staffed on modified AFSM-100 machines – obviously far 
fewer than what is specified in the Trenton Inventory and 
restated in the AFSM-100 Settlement.  The proposed 
assignments for the newly enhanced AFSM-100 were later 
disputed by both the national APWU and NPMHU, and those 
national parties are presently engaged in tripartite discussions 
to resolve that jurisdictional dispute at the national level.
4
   
                                              
4
 The upcoming changes to the AFSM-100 were not 
mentioned in the AFSM-100 Settlement.  Nonetheless, 
Trenton Metro‟s president, William Lewis, who was involved 
in the negotiations leading to the settlement, stated that the 
forthcoming enhancements were “common knowledge 
amongst the parties” at the time and that “it was [his] 
intention to „lock-in‟ clerk assignments to the AFSM in light 
of the pending modifications.”  (App. at 311, 313.)  By 
contrast, Keith Reid, the Labor Relations Specialist who 
negotiated the AFSM-100 Settlement on USPS‟s behalf, 
stated that he “was not personally aware that enhancements 
were going to be made to the AFSM 100 in the future,” and 
that during negotiations, the APWU never “mention[ed] 
upcoming enhancements to the AFSM-100.”  (App. at 169.)  
Reid stated that he did not intend the settlement agreement to 
govern staffing if there were operational changes but, rather, 
that RI-399 would govern the resolution of work assignments 
after any operational change.  Whether Reid was aware of the 
upcoming changes and whether Lewis intended to “lock-in” 
the clerk assignments ultimately has no bearing on the 
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 3) The 2006 Grievances and Trenton  
   Metro’s Lawsuit   
 
In the spring of 2006, the planned enhancements were 
made to the three AFSM-100 machines at the Trenton Post 
Office.  Subsequent to those modifications, two clerk 
positions were removed from each machine, while the mail 
handlers staffed on the machines remained.
5
  In response, 
Trenton Metro filed a number of grievances under Article 15, 
alleging that by reducing the number of clerks on the AFSM-
100 while leaving mail handlers in place, USPS violated the 
AFSM-100 Settlement.  USPS responded that the staffing 
changes were the result of operational changes to the AFSM-
100, and consequently, any dispute over those changes was a 
jurisdictional dispute covered by RI-399.  USPS  thus referred 
Trenton Metro‟s Article 15 grievances to the Local Dispute 
Resolution Committee pursuant to RI-399.   
                                                                                                     
outcome of this case.  The subsequent strategic behavior and 
subjective states of mind of the contracting parties do not 
change the import of the governing contracts. 
5
 Those work assignments are inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional assignments for the modified AFSM-100 
machines as set forth in USPS‟s letter, which would have 
resulted in only a single clerk working on each machine.  
Thus, the changed work assignments on the modified AFSM-
100 machines in the Trenton Post Office did not result in as 
severe a reduction in clerk positions as had been laid out by 
USPS.  Nonetheless, the number of clerks working on the 
machine dropped below five while mail handlers remained 
working on the machine, which is inconsistent with the 
AFSM-100 Settlement.  
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C. Procedural History 
 
 1) Trenton Metro’s Complaint and the  
   Motions for Summary Judgment 
 
On May 18, 2006, prior to the resolution of any 
grievance at the local or national level, Trenton Metro filed 
suit in the District Court.  Trenton Metro‟s complaint sought 
an injunction preventing USPS “from in any manner 
transferring bargaining unit work that would be in 
contravention of the [AFSM-100 Settlement]” as well as 
damages stemming from USPS‟s breach of the settlement.  
(App. at 57-58.)  Trenton Metro and USPS filed cross 
motions for summary judgment, and on May 28, 2008, the 
District Court issued an order granting summary judgment to 
Trenton Metro on its claim for enforcement of the AFSM-100 
Settlement but granting summary judgment to USPS on 
Trenton Metro‟s claim for damages.   
 
With respect to enforcement of the settlement 
agreement, USPS had argued that the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because Trenton Metro‟s claim 
constituted a jurisdictional dispute that was subject to the 
binding arbitration provisions in RI-399.  The District Court 
disagreed, explaining that under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), it had 
jurisdiction to enforce any “violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization,” including any settlement 
agreement that was “final and binding” and “sufficiently 
specific to be capable of implementation.”  (App. at 16.)  The 
Court determined that, because Article 15 allowed for final 
settlement of disputes short of arbitration, the AFSM-100 
Settlement was a “final adjustment of differences by a means 
selected by the parties,” and therefore, final and binding.  
13 
 
(App. at 20 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Barnes 
& Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir. 1977)).)  Next, 
because the AFSM-100 Settlement stated that the mail 
handlers would be removed before the clerks in the event of 
“any” reduction in work, the agreement applied to reductions 
in work due to modifications to the AFSM-100 and, therefore, 
the agreement was “sufficiently specific as to be capable of 
implementation.”   (App. at 21.)  Consequently, the Court 
granted Trenton Metro‟s motion for summary judgment with 
respect to enforcement of the AFSM-100 Settlement.   
 
With respect to damages, because the clerks who 
formerly staffed the AFSM-100 were all reassigned to other 
positions, and because Trenton Metro had not shown that 
USPS would have hired any new clerks or that “any clerk lost 
an identifiable amount of overtime wages based on a 
reassignment off the AFSM-100 machines,” the District 
Court held that Trenton Metro had failed to establish any 
economic harm from USPS‟s breach.  (App. at 23.)  Finally, 
the Court denied both punitive damages and attorneys‟ fees, 
finding that the “present enforcement of the [AFSM-100 
Settlement was] sufficient relief for Trenton Metro.”6  (App. 
at 24.) 
                                              
6
 The Court denied subsequent motions for 
reconsideration by both parties, but granted a subsequent 
motion by Trenton Metro to enforce the judgment, although it 
considered it “duplicative of [the] Court‟s previous Ruling.”  
(App. at 39-40.) 
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 2) NPMHU’s Motions for Leave to   
   Intervene and for Relief From Judgment 
 
On August 29, 2008 – three months after the District 
Court issued its order enforcing the ASFM-100 Settlement – 
NPMHU filed a motion for leave to intervene under Rule 24 
and a motion for relief from the District Court‟s orders of 
enforcement under Rule 60(b).  The District Court granted 
NPMHU‟s motion to intervene, finding that NPMHU‟s legal 
interests were affected by the disposition of the action, but the 
Court denied NPMHU‟s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment because NPMHU had unreasonably delayed 
seeking relief and could not show “excusable neglect or 
unfair surprise under Rule 60(b)(1).”  (Supp. App. at 5-6.)  
All three parties then appealed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 This Court has jurisdiction to review the District 
Court‟s judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether the 
District Court had jurisdiction is a question in dispute, but 
jurisdiction was asserted pursuant to the Postal 
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b).  Section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act also empowers federal 
courts “to adjudicate suits for violations of contracts between 
an employee and a labor organization.”  29 U.S.C. § 185.  We 
review de novo the District Court‟s exercise of jurisdiction.  
Shaffer v. GTE N., 284 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2002).  In 
determining whether a dispute should be resolved by 
arbitration, “there is a presumption of arbitrability,” and any 
“[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of [arbitration].”  
Lukens Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 989 F.2d 
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668, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting AT&T Techs. Inc. v. 
Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)). 
 
We review the District Court‟s grants of summary 
judgment under a plenary standard, applying “the same test 
employed by the District Court.”  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 
412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005).  We view all “evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmovant” and affirm “only 
if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”  Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
III. Discussion 
 
On appeal, USPS and NPMHU ask us to vacate the 
District Court‟s order granting summary judgment, arguing 
that the AFSM-100 Settlement did not apply to this dispute 
and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.  
NPMHU also challenges the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion 
for relief from judgment, and Trenton Metro challenges the 
grant of summary judgment to USPS on Trenton Metro‟s 
claim for damages.   
 
We agree with the Appellants that the District Court 
erred by enforcing the AFSM-100 Settlement and by 
exercising jurisdiction over this dispute.  As further explained 
herein, there are at least two reasons why the AFSM-100 
Settlement cannot be enforced to resolve this dispute:  First, 
the present dispute is a jurisdictional dispute over work 
assignments, and the record shows that the AFSM-100 
Settlement was never intended to apply to jurisdictional 
disputes.  Second, even if the AFSM-100 Settlement had been 
intended to apply to jurisdictional disputes, it is a bipartite 
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agreement, and the parties have previously agreed that any 
bipartite agreement purporting to resolve a jurisdictional 
dispute is void.   
 
The conclusion that this is a jurisdictional dispute 
means not only that it cannot be resolved by the AFSM-100 
Settlement but also that it must be resolved by the tripartite 
arbitration procedures outlined in RI-399.  We therefore also 
conclude that it was error to exercise jurisdiction over this 
case in the first instance. 
 
A. The District Court’s Grant of Summary 
Judgment With Respect to Enforcement of 
the AFSM-100 Settlement 
 
In deciding that the AFSM-100 Settlement resolved 
this dispute, the District Court relied on our opinion in United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 
806 (3d Cir. 1981).  In that case, the parties‟ collective 
bargaining agreement contained a binding arbitration 
provision but allowed disputes to be resolved short of 
arbitration by settlement.  666 F.2d at 807-08.  Any such 
settlement was, by the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement, “final and binding.”  Id.  The parties had entered 
into such a settlement agreement, and the plaintiff, claiming 
breach of that agreement, sought to enforce it in federal court.  
Id. at 808.  The defendant claimed that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction because of the mandate in the collective 
bargaining agreement for binding arbitration of all disputes.  
Id. at 809.  We held, however, that the existence of that 
arbitration provision did not necessarily preclude judicial 
enforcement of a settlement.  Rather, noting that section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act empowers federal 
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courts “to adjudicate suits for violations of contracts between 
an employee and a labor organization,” we held that we could 
enforce a settlement agreement if it was “final and binding” 
and “sufficiently specific as to be capable of 
implementation.”  Id. at 809-10; see also Barnes & Tucker, 
561 F.2d at 1096-97.  We cautioned, however, that courts 
“are bound to exercise the utmost restraint to avoid intruding 
on the bargained-for method of dispute resolution, and when 
enforcement of an arbitration award or settlement agreement 
is sought under section 301, the court must be able to say 
„with positive assurance‟ that the award or settlement was 
intended to cover the dispute.”  Consolidation Coal, 666 F.2d 
at 811.  Thus, Consolidation Coal sets out three requirements 
for a District Court to enforce a settlement agreement to 
resolve a dispute that is otherwise governed by a binding 
arbitration provision: (1) the agreement must be final and 
binding; (2) the agreement must be sufficiently specific to be 
capable of implementation; and (3) there must be “positive 
assurance” that the agreement is intended to cover the 
relevant dispute.
7
  
                                              
7
 At oral argument, USPS suggested that 
Consolidation Coal may be in tension with our decision in 
L.O. Koven & Bro. v. Local Union No. 5767, United 
Steelworkers of Am., 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).  The two 
cases can be read as in harmony, however.  In L.O. Koven, we 
held that when a settlement agreement arises out of a 
collective bargaining agreement with a mandatory arbitration 
provision, “unless a release explicitly discharges the parties 
from the collective bargaining agreement itself, or from the 
arbitration provision thereof … its effect should be 
determined by an arbitral forum.”  Id. at 204-05.  Thus, L.O. 
Koven pertains to disputes over the “effect” of a settlement 
18 
 
 
Relying on that rule, the District Court here first held 
that the AFSM-100 Settlement was final and binding because 
Article 15 (under which the grievance was brought) 
specifically allowed for settlement of grievances short of 
arbitration.  The Court next held that, because the AFSM-100 
Settlement called for mail handlers to be removed first when 
there was “any” reduction in work, it unambiguously applied 
even where the reduction in work was the result of 
modifications to the AFSM-100.  Consequently, it found the 
agreement “sufficiently specific as to be enforceable,” and 
further concluded “„with positive assurance‟ that the [AFSM-
                                                                                                     
agreement, whereas Consolidation Coal pertains to actions 
seeking enforcement of a settlement agreement when its 
effect is clear.   
Therefore, when a grievance arises out of a collective 
bargaining agreement with a mandatory arbitration provision, 
any dispute about the effect of a settlement of that grievance 
must be arbitrated.  L.O. Koven, 381 F.2d at 204-05.  If, 
however, the agreement is final and binding, “sufficiently 
specific” to allow no dispute about its effect, and is plainly 
intended to cover the grievance, then it can be enforced in 
federal court.  Consolidation Coal, 666 F.2d at 809-11.  
Consolidation Coal does not authorize courts to infringe in 
any way on parties‟ bargained-for dispute resolution 
procedures.  Rather, where parties have already resolved their 
disputes through their bargained-for procedures and those 
procedures have given rise to an unambiguous, final, and 
binding settlement agreement or arbitration award, 
Consolidation Coal simply allows judicial enforcement of 
that settlement agreement or arbitration award. 
19 
 
100 Settlement] aimed to address the present grievance.”  
(App. at 13-14.) 
 
Despite the District Court‟s thoughtful approach to this 
case, we cannot agree that there is a “„positive assurance‟ that 
the [AFSM-100 Settlement] aimed to address the present 
grievance.”  (Id.)  On the contrary, the present dispute 
implicates the staffing opportunities of the mail handlers as 
well as the clerks and, for that reason alone, is a tripartite 
jurisdictional dispute, which the AFSM-100 Settlement did 
not and could not address.   
 
 1. The Present Dispute is a Tripartite  
   Jurisdictional Dispute 
 
While the term “jurisdictional dispute” is not defined 
in any agreement of the parties, their use of the term and 
contextual clues make it clear that a jurisdictional dispute is 
any dispute over the question of which craft will get a work 
assignment – in other words, any dispute over which union‟s 
workers are properly staffed on a particular job.  That is 
exactly the kind of dispute at issue here, as it arises out of 
Trenton Metro‟s claim that mail handlers have been assigned 
work on the AFSM-100 machines that should properly have 
been assigned to clerks – a claim that is, in turn, disputed by 
USPS and NPMHU. 
 
Nonetheless, Trenton Metro argues that this is not a 
jurisdictional dispute because, for there to be a jurisdictional 
dispute under RI-399, there must have been an operational 
change
8
 and “[t]here was no operational change to the AFSM 
                                              
8
 As previously noted, supra § I.A.1, jurisdictional 
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through the implementation of the modifications.”9  (Brief of 
Cross-Appellant/Appellee Trenton Metro in 08-4084 at 24-
25.)  While the term “operational change” is not defined by 
RI-399, the significant modifications to the AFSM-100 – 
which automated a number of processes, resulted in “a 
reduction of the AFSM-100 operating crew,” “decrease[d] 
operation run times”  (App. at 319), and led to tripartite 
arbitration among USPS, APWU, and NPMHU at the 
national level – fall within any plain meaning of the term.  
Trenton Metro counters that the modifications “did not 
impact the remaining work functions” and that they therefore 
did not constitute an operational change.  (Brief of Appellee 
Trenton Metro in 09-1333 at 23-24.)  That argument, 
however, simply ignores the extensive overhaul and 
                                                                                                     
disputes can also arise out of “consolidated facilities” or “new 
work,” but no party contends that those apply here. 
   
9
 We are not convinced that the existence of either 
“consolidated facilities, new work, or an operational change” 
is a condition precedent for RI-399 to apply.  It may be that a 
better reading of RI-399 is that it unconditionally applies 
anytime the parties dispute a craft‟s jurisdiction.  
“Consolidated facilities,” “new work,” or an “operational 
change” appear to be merely categorical labels that describe 
the kind of dispute, and therefore, govern which subsection of 
RI-399 is to be followed to resolve that particular 
jurisdictional dispute.  Nonetheless, because the parties seem 
to agree that there can be a jurisdictional dispute only if one 
of those circumstances is found to exist, and because our 
decision would be the same under either interpretation, we 
will decide the case using the interpretation on which the 
parties appear to premise their arguments. 
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automation of the AFSM-100 and the resulting reduction in 
run times and staffing requirements, all of which has been 
significant enough to require the USPS, APWU, and NPMHU 
to engage in national negotiations over altered work 
assignments.  In short, on the undisputed facts, there plainly 
has been an operational change.  Whether the job duties for 
the remaining workers remain identical and whether that 
identity should prevent USPS from changing work 
assignments are part and parcel of the parties‟ jurisdictional 
dispute in the wake of that operational change. 
 
Having determined that the enhancements to the 
AFSM-100 have effected an “operational change,” the next 
question is whether the AFSM-100 Settlement was intended 
to, or capable of, resolving the resulting tripartite 
jurisdictional dispute. 
 
2. The AFSM-100 Settlement Was Not 
Intended to Apply to Tripartite 
Jurisdictional Disputes 
 
The AFSM-100 Settlement provides: 
 
The Trenton Inventory … designates work 
performed on the AFSM (see inventory) clerk 
work up to 5 Mail Processors per machine.  The 
inventory allows a MH to be a sixth person 
during heavy volume.  If reduction in work 
occurs, personnel will be moved in reverse 
order.  The result is the Mail Processors will not 
fall below the 5 required positions prior to the 
extra Mail Handler being taken off the 
operation. 
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(App. at 92.) 
 
Both USPS and Trenton Metro ignored the suggestion 
by the regional arbitrator that the dispute giving rise to the 
AFSM-100 Settlement “[was] a R.I. 399 matter” and that “the 
Mail Handlers should be invited to intervene.”  (App. at 300.)  
Instead, both USPS and Trenton Metro treated the AFSM-100 
Settlement as “merely confirm[ing] the Trenton Inventory and 
clarif[ying] staffing of the AFSM when there was a reduction 
in work.”  (Brief of Cross-Appellant/Appellee Trenton Metro 
in 08-4084 at 25.)  Executing a bilateral clarification of an 
existing work assignment does not signal any intent to 
thereby resolve future tripartite disputes regarding changes to 
that work assignment.  Nor is there any other evidence to 
provide a “„positive assurance‟ that the [AFSM-100 
Settlement] aimed to address the present grievance.”  (App. at 
13-14.) 
 
3. If the AFSM-100 Settlement Were Meant 
to Apply to Jurisdictional Disputes, it 
Would be Void 
 
While the record indicates that the AFSM-100 
Settlement was not intended to apply to jurisdictional 
disputes, if that had been the intent, the agreement would be 
void under RI-399.  The terms of RI-399 provide that “[a]ny 
settlement” of a jurisdictional dispute “must be a tripartite 
settlement.”  (App. at 196.)  The Q&A, signed by USPS, 
APWU, and NPMHU, clarified that any bilateral settlement 
agreement purporting to resolve a jurisdictional dispute “is 
not a proper settlement and is considered null and void.”  
(Supp. App. at 55.)  It does not matter that the AFSM-100 
23 
 
Settlement arose out of Article 15 of the CBA, rather than RI-
399, because the Q&A explicitly says that the voiding rule 
applies even to settlements involving contracts other than RI-
399, so long as they involve jurisdictional disputes.  And it 
could not be otherwise without undermining the laudatory 
purpose of RI-399, which is to ensure that all concerned 
parties are involved in any resolution of a jurisdictional 
dispute.  Thus, the RI-399 and the Q&A direct that any 
settlement agreement of any sort that purports to resolve a 
jurisdictional dispute must be tripartite and that any bipartite 
agreement is null and void.  Consequently, even if the AFSM-
100 Settlement were intended to apply to tripartite 
jurisdictional disputes, it would be void as merely a bipartite 
agreement. 
 
B. The District Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction 
 
The parties have agreed that RI-399 provides the 
exclusive procedure for resolving jurisdictional disputes.  
Thus, our conclusion that this is a jurisdictional dispute 
mandates the further conclusion that it must be resolved 
pursuant to RI-399 according to binding tripartite arbitration 
procedures.  Where a dispute is subject to a binding 
arbitration agreement, a “district court [is] … without 
jurisdiction to address the merits of the complaint.”   Shaffer 
v. Mitchell Transport, Inc., 635 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1980).  
Consequently, we must order the dismissal of Trenton 
Metro‟s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.10 
                                              
10
 Our decision to vacate the judgment in favor of 
Trenton Metro and to require dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction renders moot NPMHU‟s appeal of the 
denied Rule 60(b) motion and Trenton Metro‟s appeal of 
24 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order granting summary judgment to Trenton Metro 
and will order the dismissal of Trenton Metro‟s complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                     
summary judgment in favor of USPS on damages. 
